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Often employers will agree to pay their employees more than the minimum the
employees would accept for performing the job in question. One reason for this
behavior is that such "fair" treatment by employers may encourage better job
performance by employees. In her contribution to the Symposium, Professor
Christine Jolls examines some of the legal implications of this "fairness dynamic."
Empirical evidence strongly supports the idea that some employers will offer to pay
employees more than the minimum amount the employees would accept in order to
induce them to exert more effort, and that employees respond in turn by working
harder. Fairness behavior is of special relevance to employers when monitoring
and punishment for inadequate performance would prove difficuL Once the fair-
ness dynamic described here is taken into account, the argument for the minimum
wage requirement imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act is undercut in situa-
tions where employees are relatively difficult to monitor, as fairness considerations
will tend to drive the wage up regardless. This legal conclusion is a reminder that
while behavioral law and economics may sometimes be more likely than traditional
law and economics to support legal intervention, in other cases the opposite is true.
"My partner and I recently hired a half-time babysitter and are
very happy to have found her, but we're feeling frustrated by the
amount we agreed to pay," someone recently told me in a backyard
conversation. "Well, why did you settle on that pay level?" I asked.
"I suppose because the sitter is going to be in our house alone caring
for our children for a significant amount of time, and we just didn't
feel we should negotiate for a lower level of pay even though we be-
lieve we could have gotten one."
Why did these parents agree to pay the babysitter more than they
"needed" to? Should they have? And what are the consequences of
this dynamic for the desirability of legal regulation of employment
relationships?
Behavioral economics can help to answer these questions. Be-
havioral economics arises out of three "bounds" on human behavior:
bounded rationality, bounded will power, and bounded self-interest.'
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Bounded rationality, an idea originally due to Herbert Simon, refers
to the limits that exist on individuals' cognitive functions.2 Bounded
will power involves limits on individuals' ability to exercise self-con-
trol.3 Bounded self-interest reflects the idea that people care about
being treated fairly and want to treat others fairly in certain settings.4
One important component of bounded self-interest is that people who
are the beneficiaries of fair behavior tend to reciprocate such behavior
even when doing so imposes a financial or other cost on them.5 To-
gether these three bounds define behavioral economics as an alterna-
tive to traditional economic analysis.6
The legal literature already contains significant discussions of
both bounded rationality and bounded will power in the specific con-
text of the employment relationship-the context on which this Sym-
posium focuses. 7 The existing legal literature, however, contains
surprisingly little discussion of the aspect of bounded self-interest
noted just above-in which people reciprocate fair behavior-insofar
as the employment relationship and its regulation by the law are con-
cerned. My contribution to the Symposium attempts to fill the gap.
Part I below describes empirical findings from the economics
literature that point to the significant role of this aspect of fairness
behavior in the employment relationship. As described below, the
empirical evidence suggests that some employers choose to pay em-
ployees more than the minimum amount those employees would ac-
cept in order to induce them to exert effort, and that employees
respond to such "fair" behavior by working harder. I shall refer to
this behavior as the "fairness dynamic." Also as described below, fair-
ness may intervene in a variety of other ways in the employment rela-
tionship, but my focus here is on the specific instance of fairness
behavior reflected in the fairness dynamic.
The babysitting example from above illustrates the basic point.
The parents decided to pay more than the minimum amount they be-
lieved the babysitter would accept because the babysitter would be
2 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99,
99-100, 103-10 (1955).
3 See Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J.
Pol. Econ. 392, 392-93 (1981).
4 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83
Am. Econ. Rev. 1281, 1281-82 (1993).
5 E.g., Ernst Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Does Fairness Prevent Market
Clearing? An Experimental Investigation, 108 Q.J. Econ. 437, 437-39 (1993).
6 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1476-77.
7 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va. L. Rev.
205 (2001) (bounded rationality); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psycho-
logical Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275 (1991) (bounded will
power).
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caring for their children alone for significant amounts of time, and the
parents wanted to ensure the right level of "effort" (to use the eco-
nomic term) from the babysitter. Hopefully, the babysitter is recipro-
cating as anticipated by the fairness dynamic. As this example
suggests, a driving force behind the fairness dynamic is the difficulty
of inducing high effort through direct monitoring and punishment for
low effort. Where high effort cannot be ensured through monitoring
and punishment (as for instance in the babysitting example, where the
parents are not present), a fair wage provides an alternative means by
which an employer may be able to encourage an employee to work
hard.
Part II below describes some implications of the fairness dynamic
for the coverage and enforcement of the minimum wage requirement
imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8 Part II turns to
the context of legal regulation of employee benefits and offers a few
brief remarks on the implications of the fairness dynamic for the regu-
lation of such benefits. My central conclusions are as follows:
First, once fairness is taken into account, a minimum wage re-
quirement is less necessary to raise wages, all else equal, in situations
in which employees are difficult to monitor than in situations in which
they are relatively easy to monitor. (A minimum wage may still be
important in setting expectations of what counts as a "fair" wage,
however.) If employees are difficult to monitor, then fairness consid-
erations may push toward a higher wage wholly apart from legal regu-
lation, as employers strive to pay employees "fairly" in order to
encourage diligence and hard work on the employees' part. If, by
contrast, monitoring is relatively easy, then fairness considerations do
not create any upward pressure on wages, as employees can simply be
fired if monitoring discloses that they have not performed well. Mini-
mum wage laws are more necessary to raise wages, all else equal, in
the latter context.
Second, the argument offered here provides a new way to under-
stand the FLSA's familiar exemption of "executive, administrative,
and professional employees" from the minimum wage requirement. 9
At an obvious level, these employees "need" the protection of wage
regulation less than other employees because they are likely to earn
more in the first instance. Also, though, and more subtly, they "need"
the protection of the law less because the nature of their work makes
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. V 2000), amended by Worker Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-202, 114 Stat. 308 (2000).
9 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1994).
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monitoring difficult and thus the fairness dynamic produces upward
pressure on their wages regardless of the existence of legal regulation.
Third, and more controversially, the monitoring argument may
help to make at least partial sense of one of the largest and most de-
bated historical exemptions from the FLSA, that for domestic service
employees. Until 1974, such employees were not covered by the
FLSA at all, as described below. But to the extent that such employ-
ees are involved in child care (as, for instance, in the babysitting ex-
ample above), the quality of their performance will often be difficult
to monitor, and thus minimum wage regulation may again be less nec-
essary to raise wages for these employees than for otherwise similar
employees whose performance is easier to monitor.
Fourth, and again controversially, the monitoring argument may
also provide some support for the failure of the FLSA to cover
independent contractors. Under the legal definition of an indepen-
dent contractor, such individuals are more likely to be difficult to
monitor than individuals who qualify as employees. Monitoring diffi-
culties therefore again suggest upward pressure on wages without any
need for legal regulation. The point here is not that independent con-
tractors never require the protection of minimum wage regulation; it
is just that, all else equal, they are less likely than those who qualify as
employees to require such protection.
Fifth, compliance problems with the minimum wage requirement
should be smaller in situations in which employees are difficult to
monitor than in situations in which they are relatively easy to monitor.
Again, if employees are difficult to monitor, then fairness considera-
tions are more likely to exert upward pressure on wages wholly apart
from any legal regulation. In this instance, the minimum wage re-
quirement is more likely not to be binding and compliance will there-
fore not be a serious issue.
Sixth, fairness considerations are less relevant to policy decisions
in the context of employee benefits than in the context of minimum
wage regulation. This is so because market failures that are not rele-
vant in the minimum wage context become relevant in the employee
benefits context, as described below.
As many of the elements of the foregoing summary suggest, the
policy implications of the fairness dynamic tend to be distinctly of the
laissez-faire variety. If people will behave appropriately without legal
regulation-as the fairness dynamic suggests they may-then perhaps
the market should be left to function without legal regulation. This
creates an intriguing political juxtaposition, as liberals are probably
more open in general to the importance of a phenomenon like fair-
ness, but then when one looks to implications for the law it turns out
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that, at least in this context, the conclusions are generally more apt to
please conservatives. I elaborate on, as well as qualify, these claims
about politics in the last section below.
I
THE FAiN1,ss DYNAMIc IN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIPS
As Nobel Laureate Robert Solow has written, "[T]he fundamen-
tal reason for believing that fairness is a factor in labor markets is
what we know about our own society and culture.... [W]age rates
and employment are profoundly entwined with social status and self-
esteem .... "10 Albert Rees offers the following telling anecdote:
Beginning in the mid-1970s, I began to find myself in a series of
roles in which I participated in setting or controlling wages and sala-
ries.... In none of those roles did I find the [neoclassical theory of
wage determination] I had been teaching for so long to be of the
slightest help.... The one factor that seemed to be of overwhelming
importance in all these real-world situations was fairness."
Fairness may play many important roles in wage setting and other
aspects of the employment relationship. (Various conceptions of fair-
ness probably also underlie many laws regulating the employment re-
lationship.)12 Studies by Alan Blinder and Don Choi, by Carl
Campbell and Kunal Kamlani, and by Daniel Kahmeman, Jack
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, for example, examine perceptions of the
fairness or unfairness of wage adjustments in response to various de-
mand- or supply-side shifts in the economy and find that such percep-
tions have significant effects-just as Solow's 1979 article, "Another
Possible Source of Wage Stickiness," suggested they would.' 3 Fairness
also appears to play a major role in the determination of the relative
10 Robert M. Solow, The Labor Market as a Social Institution 9-10 (1990).
11 Albert Rees, The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination, 11 J. Lab. Econ. 243,243-
44 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act,
18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 19 (2000).
13 See Alan S. Blinder & Don H. Choi, A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage
Stickiness, 105 Q.J. Econ. 1003, 1008-09 (1990); Carl M. Campbell III & Kunal S. Kamlani,
The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms, 112 Q.J. Econ. 759,759,
765-80 (1997); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728, 730-33
(1986); Robert M. Solow, Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness, 1 J. Macroecon. 79,
80 (1979).
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wages of various groups of employees within a firm, as Truman
Bewley and David Levine, among others, have emphasized. 14
The discussion to follow, however, focuses not on this whole
range of fairness behavior in the employment relationship but rather
on one specific form of such behavior. The behavior on which I focus
has its theoretical basis in the efficiency wage model of George
Akerlof and Janet Yellen.15 In this model, employers pay wages
above employees' "reservation wage"-the minimum level they
would demand for their services-in order to induce reciprocation in
the form of high levels of effort. 16 On a macroeconomic level, this
fairness dynamic can explain the otherwise puzzling existence of invol-
untary unemployment in the economy.' 7
Fairness, of course, is not the only explanation for efficiency
wages; for instance, such wages may also be explained by employers'
desire to increase the wage loss to employees fired for poor perform-
ance (or "shirking") and thus to increase employees' incentive not to
engage in such shirking.18 Akerlof and Yellen have summarized a va-
riety of explanations for efficiency wages.1 9 The discussion to follow,
however, focuses on the fairness version of the efficiency wage model
and the empirical evidence that supports it.
As long ago as 1929, Sumner Slichter emphasized the role of fair
treatment in spurring high levels of effort by employees.20 Slichter
noted that the poor state of the economy beginning in 1920 had not
led to a reversion to the harsh labor practices that prevailed in the
"buyers' market" for labor before the first World War, and he con-
cluded that "[p]ossibly the most important determinant of post-war
labor policies... has been the growing realization by managers of the
close relationship between industrial morale and efficiency. ' 21 As dis-
cussed by, among others, Gary Charness and David Levine, setting
what is thought to be a fair wage may spur not only more exertion of
14 See Truman F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession 75-82 (1999);
David I. Levine, Fairness, Markets, and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Ex-
ecutives, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1241, 1252-57 (1993).
15 George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unem-
ployment, 105 Q.J. Econ. 255 (1990); George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift
Exchange, 97 Q.J. Econ. 543 (1982).
16 E.g., Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 15, at 255-56.
17 Id. at 256.
18 See Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Dis-
cipline Device, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1984).
19 George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Introduction to Efficiency Wage Models of the
Labor Market 1, 4-8 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
20 Sumner H. Slichter, The Current Labor Policies of American Industries, 43 Q.J.
Econ. 393, 401-04 (1929).
21 Id. at 396-97, 401.
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effort in an employee's specifically designated responsibilities but also
higher levels of "organizational citizenship behavior" outside those
designated responsibilities.22 Truman Bewley's survey of managers
suggests that setting what is perceived to be a fair wage plays a major
role in inducing appropriate employee behavior (although, as noted
above, Bewley gives particular attention, in the determination of what
is a "fair" wage, to the role of coworkers' wages, whereas the empiri-
cal evidence emphasized in what follows is more focused on the abso-
lute level of the wage),23
In a 1993 article published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Ernst Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl provide strong em-
pirical support for the Akerlof and Yellen version of the efficiency
wage model.24 The authors' experimental results, using subjects who
were students at the University of Vienna or the University of Tech-
nology in Vienna, 2 have been replicated in numerous subsequent
studies, including one in which the stakes were two to three times par-
ticipants' monthly incomes.26
To provide the strongest possible test of the fairness hypothesis,
Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl used the labels "buyer" and "seller" for
subjects assigned (respectively) to the "employer" and "employee"
groups.27 This is likely to provide the strongest possible test because
fairness considerations seem more likely to be present in employer-
employee relationships, which usually involve social interaction, than
in the relationship between the buyer and the seller of a type of good
other than labor.28 If fairness is important even when the labels of
employer and employee are not used, then it is even more likely to be
important (or at a minimum is no less likely to be important) in a
setting in which those labels are used. Consistent with this conclusion,
a subsequent article by Fehr, Erich Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold, and
22 Gary Chamess & David I. Levine, When Are Layoffs Acceptable? Evidence from a
Quasi-Experiment, 53 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 381, 383 (2000).
23 Bewley, supra note 14, at 415.
24 Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, supra note 5, at 438-39, 446-53.
25 Id. at 440 n.5.
26 See Armin Falk, Simon Gichter & Judit KovAcs, Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic
Incentives in a Repeated Game with Incomplete Contracts, 20 J. Econ. Psych. 251, 266,
269-71, 273-74 (1999); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incom-
plete Contract Market, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 106, 111, 117-28 (1999); Ernst Fehr, Erich
Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold & Simon Gachter, When Social Norms Overpower Competi-
tion: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets, 16 J. Lab. Econ. 324, 327-28, 333-37
(1998); Ernst Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in
Competitive Experimental Markets, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1, 3, 11-16, 19-20 (1998); Ernst
Fehr & Elena Tougareva, Do High Monetary Stakes Remove Reciprocal Fairness? 11-17
(June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review).
27 Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, supra note 5, at 439 n.2.
28 Id.
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Simon Gdichter that replicates the original test using employer and
employee labels finds strong effects of fairness.29
In the first stage of the original Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl ex-
periment, "employers" are given a specified period of time in which to
bid for the services of a single, unknown "employee. ' 30 Bids consist
of the wage that the employer will pay the employee.31 In the second
stage, those employees who have accepted offers of employment at
the specified wages are able to set an effort level at which they will
perform.32 Higher effort levels are associated with increases in em-
ployers' payoffs, as employers earn higher profits, but with decreases
in employees' payoffs, as effort is costly.33 Wages may not be made
contingent upon effort levels, and employers have no ability to retali-
ate for low effort levels in future periods because they do not know
the identity of their particular employee.34 Thus, it is impossible for
employers to induce high effort levels by a strategy of monitoring em-
ployees and punishing them for poor performance.
According to the traditional model, the results of this experiment
are quite predictable. Employees will always choose the minimum ef-
fort level in the second period so as to maximize their payoffs; their
wage has been fixed in the first period, punishment for low effort is
not feasible, and effort is costly. Employers, aware of this incentive,
should assume low employee effort and offer a wage that puts em-
ployees just above their "reservation level" (the minimum level they
would demand for their services). Employees should accept the of-
fered wage since it is above the reservation level. The result is a low-
wage, low-effort equilibrium. 35 Does this simple prediction square
with the experimental results?
No. Employers in the above setting typically choose wage levels
above the level predicted by the analysis just described, and employ-
ees respond by choosing effort levels significantly in excess of the min-
imum feasible level. 36 Figure 1 below demonstrates the relationship
graphically. As the figure shows, only one employer offered a wage of
thirty, the lowest feasible level above the reservation level assuming
the minimum level of effort. 37 For most employer-employee pairs, by
contrast, an equilibrium with a higher wage and a correspondingly
29 Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold & Gichter, supra note 26, at 327-28, 333-37.
30 Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, supra note 5, at 439.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 440.
33 Id. at 441.
34 Id. at 439-41.
35 Id. at 443.
36 Id. at 446.
37 See id. at 443 (explaining why lowest feasible wage is thirty).
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higher level of effort replaces the low-wage, low-effort equilibrium
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These results may reflect concerns with fairness. Workers who
receive wages above the low level predicted by the traditional analysis
may offer high levels of effort in response based on their perceptions
of the fairness of the employers' behavior, and employers, aware of
this result, can maximize their profits by offering such generous
wages. This is the basic mechanism contemplated by the Akerlof and
Yellen theory.39 Subsequent work by Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and
Gdichter confirms the fit between the Akerlof and Yellen model and
the behavior we observe in the experiments by showing that employ-
ers' offers of high wages do not reflect an unwillingness by employees
to work for less but instead, as envisioned by the efficiency wage
model, reflect a desire by employers to encourage high levels of effort
by paying employees more than the reservation level they would de-
mand for their services.40 Lawrence Mitchell, in a recent article, of-
38 This figure is reprinted with permission from id. at 447.
39 See sources cited supra note 15.
40 See Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold & Gtichter, supra note 26, at 327-29. The mechanism
used to test apart the two explanations is ingenious. Fehr, KirchIer, Weichbold, and
Gachter compare the results from the original experiment (described in the text) to the
results from an alternative experiment in which effort levels are specified in advance by the
experimenter rather than being subject to the choice of the employee. Wages are substan-
tially higher in the original set-up than in the alternative. This shows that what is driving
the high wages is the desire by employers to encourage high effort, as contemplated by the
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fers a wonderful anecdote suggesting a related dynamic, although with
reverse timing: A contractor he had hired put in an extraordinary
level of effort, after which Mitchell paid him more than twice what he
had agreed to work for.41
As the discussion here suggests, employers in the model posited
by the fairness dynamic are not necessarily motivated by an affirma-
tive desire to behave fairly toward employees (although they might be
so motivated). Employers may simply be responding in a profit-maxi-
mizing manner to employees' reactions to behavior perceived by them
to be fair. In this respect the empirical findings described here are
similar to the findings from the well-known "ultimatum game." In
that game, the "proposing" player suggests an allocation of a sum of
money between herself and another player, and the "responding"
player may then either accept or decline this offer. If the latter course
is taken, both players get nothing. When this game is played in exper-
imental settings, responding players typically decline offers of less
than twenty to thirty percent of the sum to be divided even though
this means they get nothing, and proposing players rationally antici-
pate such behavior by offering shares closer to forty or fifty percent.42
As in the Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl context, this behavior by the
first-moving player may well reflect not affirmative concerns about
fairness on this player's part but instead simple profit maximization in
light of fairness behavior by the second-moving player.43 The ultima-
tum game differs from the present setting, however, in that in the ulti-
matum game the second-moving party's response to behavior thought
to be fair is to do what standard economic theory would predict (ac-
cept the offer), while in the present setting the employee's response to
behavior thought to be fair is to do the opposite of what standard
economic theory would predict (exert significant rather than minimal
effort). In this sense the behavior of the second-moving party in the
Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl setting might be said to reflect affirma-
tive concerns for fairness. 44
An interesting extension of the model described here suggests
that employers may actually gain by intentionally structuring the
efficiency wage model, rather than the unwillingness of the employee to work for a smaller
sum. See id. at 327-29 (summarizing two sets of experiments and their results).
41 Lawrence F. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 593-95
(2001).
42 See Werner Giith, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analy-
sis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367, 371-72, 375 tbls.4 & 5 (1982);
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S291 tbl.2 (1986).
43 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1492.
4 See id.
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workplace in a participatory manner, so that employees must be self-
directed and self-motivated rather than being subjected to monitoring
of performance and punishment for poor performance; this is so be-
cause the higher effort that may result from work in a self-directed
setting produces efficiency gains for both parties.45 This analysis
points to a rejection of a Taylorist model under which employees
should be given highly discrete and specialized tasks and then closely
monitored in their performance of those tasks.46 Robert Cooter and
Melvin Eisenberg have discussed other steps firms can take to in-
crease their employees' propensity to engage in "fair" behavior.47
More broadly, the fairness dynamic described here is consistent
with economics and political science literatures suggesting the effi-
ciency aspects of "trust" relationships. 48 Empirically, higher levels of
trust are correlated across regions and across countries with better ec-
onomic performance. 49 These results suggest that the opportunity to
build upon trust relationships enhances efficiency.50 Considerations
of trust arise in the fairness dynamic between employers and employ-
ees because when employers cannot directly monitor their employees'
effort, they must trust them to perform well in response to being of-
fered "fair" wages.
The discussion to follow briefly describes the implications of the
fairness dynamic for the legal regulation of wages and employee
benefits.
II
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAiRI'ss DYNAMI c
FOR THE FLSA's MINIMUM
WAGE REQUIREMENT
At the most basic level, the fairness dynamic suggests that a mini-
mum wage requirement may be less necessary to raise wages than
might otherwise be thought, for the essential idea behind the dynamic
45 See, e.g., David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and
the Firm's Environment, in Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence 183, 187-88
(Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
46 See, e.g., Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management 36-48
(1911).
47 Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms,
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1717, 1726-28 (2001).
48 See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Trust in Large Organizations, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceed-
ings), May 1997, at 333 (summarizing these literatures).
49 Id. at 333-36.
50 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, among others, have discussed this point in the legal
literature. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1753-58 (2001).
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is that employers and employees may find their way to an equilibrium
with higher wages entirely on their own. But at some level this obser-
vation is too simple, for a premise of the fairness dynamic is that high
effort cannot be ensured by the direct mechanism of monitoring effort
and then punishing employees who fail to perform up to par. Such
monitoring and punishment are obviously possible in some settings;
for instance, in the telemarketing sector studied by Daniel Nagin,
James Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell Taylor-a setting in which
employee misbehavior takes the form of reporting successful solicita-
tions when in fact the solicitee responded negatively-misbehavior
can be checked by calling back a certain fraction of the solicitees to
confirm their responses.5 1 Because monitoring and punishment are
possible in some settings, a more refined set of conclusions from the
fairness dynamic focuses on settings in which a minimum wage re-
quirement is likely to be more or less necessary to raise wages.
The discussion to follow emphasizes the ease of monitoring
rather than the ease of punishment for low effort by an employee be-
cause the former seems easier to theorize about a priori. This empha-
sis marks a contrast with the original Akerlof article, which takes as its
motivation a situation in which employees-young women in the first
part of the twentieth century-were not difficult to monitor (indeed
their output was known with exactitude) but were difficult to punish
because their attachment to the labor force was quite limited (as most
left the job within a short time to marry). 52
The following discussion uses differences in the likely ease of
monitoring to try to make sense of the scope of coverage of the
FLSA's minimum wage requirement and to predict variations in the
degree of compliance with this requirement within covered sectors. In
terms of the FLSA's coverage, the claim will not be that the fairness
dynamic provides a comprehensive framework to make sense of the
overall statutory structure of the FLSA's minimum wage requirement.
That requirement is subject to a number of rather random-sounding
exemptions, including for various employees working in the fishing
and agricultural industries, employees working in summer camps and
similar recreational establishments, and employees employed by small
newspapers or telephone companies.53 The analysis offered here does
51 Daniel Nagin, James Rebitzer, Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, Monitoring, Motiva-
tion and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experi-
ment 1-2 (Aug. 14, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University
Law Review).
52 See Akerlof, supra note 15, at 546-48.
53 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3), (5)-(6), (8), (10) (1994).
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not purport to explain all of these exemptions, just to make some
sense of the particular ones discussed below.
A. Coverage
1. The Exemption for "Executive, Administrative, or Professional"
Employees
One of the most important exemptions from the coverage of the
FLSA's minimum wage requirement is the exemption for bona fide
"executive, administrative, or professional" employees.5 4 Of course
the most transparent explanation for this exemption is that such em-
ployees do not need the protection of a minimum wage law to ensure
that they receive a decent wage, as they are performing reasonably
high-level work. This is probably true in most instances, but, as Marc
Linder has emphasized, there are important circumstances in which
employees who fall within the "executive, administrative, or profes-
sional" category as the law defines it are in fact earning in the range of
the minimum wage, so that a minimum wage requirement might be-
come relevant to them; he emphasizes the example of fast-food res-
taurant managers. 55
To be sure, the Secretary of Labor imposes a "salary test" as part
of the inquiry into whether an employee is employed in an "executive,
administrative, or professional" capacity.56 Under this test, an em-
ployee must be paid a salary of at least a specific level to fall within
the "executive, administrative, or professional" category.5 7 But the
Secretary has not revised the salary test over the past twenty-six
years. 58 (The actual history is more complicated, with various twists
and turns that Linder has engagingly described.) 59 Thus, at present,
an executive or administrative employee who earns $155 per week,
and a professional employee who earns $170 per week, may meet the
salary test,60 yet the pay rate reflected in those salaries is less than the
minimum wage of $5.15 an hour for a full-time worker.6' Thus, it is
54 § 213(a)(1).
55 Marc Linder, Closing the Gap Between Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the Depart-
ment of Labor On?, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1, 1-3, 23 (1993-1994).
56 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (2000) ("executive" employees); id. § 541.2(e) ("administra-
tive" employees); id. § 541.3(e) ("professional" employees).
57 See id. 88 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e).
58 See Berne C. Kluber, FLSA Exemptions and the Computing Workforce, 33 Hous. L.
Rev. 859, 869 (1996) (describing last revision in 1975).
59 Linder, supra note 55, at 12-19.
60 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (2000).
61 See Elissa Gootman, Hempstead Takes Back New Minimum Wage Law, Officials
Fear Measure Might Deter Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2001, at D5 (stating current
hourly minimum wage).
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quite possible that someone employed in an "executive, administra-
tive, or professional" capacity as that category is legally defined would
be earning at a sub-minimum-wage level. A fortiori, a person em-
ployed in an "executive, administrative, or professional" capacity
could be earning just above the minimum wage. The point is that
even an "executive, administrative, or professional" employee may be
earning in a range such that the minimum wage requirement might
become relevant, and thus it is interesting to ask whether nonetheless
there are grounds for exempting such an employee from coverage.
This is where the fairness dynamic comes in. The effort levels of
most individuals employed in an "executive, administrative, or profes-
sional" capacity are likely to be difficult to monitor because of the
relative complexity and multidimensionality of at least a substantial
portion of their work. In such a setting, fairness considerations may
exert an upward force on wages and thus make a minimum wage re-
quirement less necessary than it would otherwise be, as described
above.
Note that the point is not that Congress drafted the exemption
for "executive, administrative, or professional" employees based on
this motivation. My point here is not to describe the intent or goals of
Congress. 62 Instead, the fairness dynamic provides a possible rational-
ization, or way to make sense, of the statutory exemption of "execu-
tive, administrative, or professional" employees. The same point
about distinguishing Congress's motivation from rationalizing or mak-
ing sense of the statutory structure applies even more forcefully to the
discussion just below of the historical exemption for domestic service
employees, whose exclusion from the FLSA Linder and Laurence
Norton have forcefully argued resulted from racism on the part of
New Deal lawmakers. 63
62 For a rich description of the legislative process leading to the passage of the exemp-
tion for "executive, administrative, or professional" employees, see Deborah C. Malamud,
Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 2212, 2286-89 (1998).
63 See Marc Linder, Migrant Workers and Minimum Wages: Regulating the Exploita-
tion of Agricultural Labor in the United States 154-55 (1992); Marc Linder, Farm Workers
and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
1335, 1373-75 (1987); Laurence E. Norton II & Marc Linder, Down and Out in Weslaco,
Texas and Washington, D.C.: Race-Based Discrimination Against Farm Workers Under
Federal Unemployment Insurance, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 177, 196-97 (1995-1996).
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2. The Now-Abandoned Exemption for Domestic Service
Employees
Until 1974, all domestic service employees were exempt from the
FLSA.64 The exemption has now been largely abandoned, although
the statutory path leading to this result and the precise scope of the
exemption's abandonment turn out to be rather complex.
Under the basic provision currently exempting certain categories
of employees from the FLSA's minimum wage requirement, employ-
ees employed in "domestic service employment to provide compan-
ionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are
unable to care for themselves" are excluded from coverage.65 But, at
the same time, a separate provision within the section of the statute
affirmatively setting forth the minimum wage requirement specifically
provides that domestic service employees "shall be paid wages at a
rate not less than the wage rate in effect under [the minimum wage
provision] unless such employee's compensation for such service
would not because of section 209(a)(6) of the Social Security Act...
constitute wages for the purposes of title II of such Act."' 66 Section
209(a)(6) of the Social Security Act sets forth an exemption from the
definition of "wages" remuneration paid to domestic service employ-
ees if such remuneration is paid in a medium other than cash or if such
remuneration is below a specified threshold (set at $1000 in 1994).67
At a minimum, the effect of these provisions taken together is that
domestic service employees not providing "companionship services"
for the aged or infirm (and not employed on a casual basis to provide
babysitting services, as discussed just below) must be paid the mini-
mum wage as long as they meet the minimal annual cash earnings
threshold specified in the Social Security Act.
The same section of the FLSA that sets forth an exemption from
the coverage of the minimum wage requirement for those providing
"companionship services" for the aged or infirm also sets forth an ex-
emption for those employed "on a casual basis in domestic service
employment to provide babysitting services."' 68 "Casual basis," how-
ever, has been defined by the Secretary of Labor as "employment
64 E.g., Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 45, 57 & n.54
(2000).
65 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1994).
66 § 206(f)(1).
67 42 U.S.C. § 409(a)(6) (1994) (referencing I.R.C. § 3121(x) (1994)). Section 3121(x)
of Title 26 was initially enacted in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-387, § 2(a)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 4071,
4071 (1994).
68 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1994).
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which is irregular or intermittent, and which is not performed by an
individual whose vocation is babysitting. '69 Thus, those employed on
a regular or steady basis to provide babysitting services are not ex-
empted from the coverage of the minimum wage requirement. Those
providing regular or steady babysitting services are also affirmatively
covered under the provision quoted above applying the minimum
wage requirement to domestic service employees who meet the an-
nual cash earnings threshold specified by the Social Security Act.70
But what of the historical exemption of domestic service employ-
ees from the minimum wage requirement? At one level, the exemp-
tion seems quite surprising. While high-level professional "nannies"
are often paid well above the minimum wage (more than $40,000 an-
nually, plus benefits, in large cities),71 and thus these individuals
would not be affected by an exemption from the minimum wage re-
quirement, other domestic service employees are, and presumably
were, among the most vulnerable in the economy.72 Why should these
employees have been excluded from the coverage of the minimum
wage requirement?
One rationale that has been offered for the exemption of domes-
tic service employees is the privacy concerns of the households em-
ploying these individuals.73 (Other accounts emphasize racist aspects,
as noted earlier.)74 In the words of Jane Addams, a turn-of-the-cen-
tury social reformer, "[The domestic's] position is peculiar. She is in
the family, but not of it .... -175 Households "do not see themselves as
employers," as one member of Congress put it in a discussion of the
treatment of domestic service employees. 76
The fairness dynamic, however, provides an interesting variation
on this theme of household "privacy." Some forms of household
work-particularly care for children-are difficult to monitor. While
one knows whether the employee is present for work, the quality of
69 29 C.F.R. § 552.5 (2000).
70 29 U.S.C. § 206(f)(1) (1994); supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
71 See Leslie Eaton, Show Nanny the Money: As Economy Booms, Pay Rise for Child-
Care Workers, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1998, at 27 (noting nanny salary of $800 per week plus
benefits).
72 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 64, at 53-54.
73 See generally Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender,
Race and Agendas of Reform, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 851, 906-15 (1999).
74 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75 Jane Addams, Social Conditions in Domestic Service, 13 Mass. Lab. Bull. 1, 1-2
(1900), quoted in Smith, supra note 73, at 852.
76 Proposals to Simplify and Streamline the Payment of Employment Taxes for Domes-
tic Workers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 4, 18 (1993)
(statement of Rep. Meek), quoted in Smith, supra note 64, at 57 n.55.
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the work is, or can be, extremely subtle in its variations, in ways that
cannot be monitored well unless the employer hovers over the em-
ployee, which of course would tend to defeat the purpose of hiring the
employee in the first place. The fairness dynamic suggests that em-
ployers and employees may end up at an equilibrium with a higher-
than-expected wage, and a correspondingly higher level of effort,
without the intervention of a minimum wage requirement. If this
analysis carries some truth, then a minimum wage requirement may
be less necessary to raise the wages of certain domestic service em-
ployees than to raise the wages of otherwise similar employees work-
ing in different settings.
Of course, many domestic service employees perform tasks-
such as various housework duties-that may not involve the sort of
discretion associated with child care, and much of the literature on
domestic service employees and their abuse at their employers' hands
focuses directly on such employees, who are not the subject of the
fairness argument here and who may very well desperately need the
protection of a minimum wage requirement.77 Moreover, at the other
end of the spectrum, certain domestic service employees-such as
high-level professional nannies-are in a wholly different category
from those domestic service employees who could conceivably stand
to gain from the application of a minimum wage requirement; as al-
ready noted, professional nannies earn dramatically in excess of the
minimum wage. However, some in-home child care workers do earn
relatively low wages78 (and presumably also did in the past, although
it is hard to get access to good data for the pre-1974 period for child
care workers as distinguished from other domestic service employees);
and thus it remains an interesting question whether it makes sense for
the minimum wage requirement to apply to these child care workers.
77 See, e.g., Mary Romero, Unraveling Privilege: Workers' Children and the Hidden
Costs of Paid Childcare, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1651,1670 n.110 (2001) (describing employer
advantage-taking against employee who provided housecleaning services); Smith, supra
note 64, at 46-58 & n.3 (defining "domestic service employees" as those who perform
housework duties including "cleaning, laundering, and cooking" and detailing vulnerabili-
ties of such employees).
78 The Bureau of Labor Statistics states that earnings of "private household workers,"
including child care workers, "vary from about $10 an hour... to less than... $5.15 an
hour...." Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Outlook Hand-
book 355, 357 (2000-01 ed. 2000). The Bureau reports that the average weekly pay of child
care workers in 1998 was $204, which translates to $5.10 an hour with a forty-hour work
week (although many child care workers work less than that, so the hourly rate would be
somewhat higher). Id. at 357. Because, as noted previously, professional nannies may earn
more than $40,000 annually, or more than $19 per hour assuming a forty-hour work week,
other in-home child care workers must earn at or near the minimum wage.
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In considering the application of the fairness dynamic to such
workers, it is illuminating to contrast these workers with another cate-
gory of relatively low-paid employees, the category of fast-food
preparer or server. As wonderfully documented in the video Fast
Food Women,79 the trend in at least some sections of the fast-food
business has been toward increased routinization of tasks to the point
that employees have absolutely no discretion in performing their
tasks. In my favorite example, employees are instructed with great
precision and with the use of numerous large color charts on the
proper order in which to stack the elements of a hamburger sandwich
(lettuce, tomato, cheese, hamburger, etc.); thus even the most trivial
details about performing the work are pinned down in advance by
management rather than being left to the employee's judgment. It is
hard to imagine a more Taylorist workplace.
In light of the absence of discretion and multidimensionality in at
least some sectors of the fast-food industry, employee performance in
these settings is likely to be fairly easy to monitor, and thus it is not
surprising to learn that nearly all of the employees in Fast Food
Women earned the minimum wage. As Truman Bewley has noted, if
work requires little of "employees' imagination or general coopera-
tion" and is "mechanical" in its nature, then "supervision is easy" and
"there is almost no need to foster good morale" by offering higher
wages.80 In such settings, Bewley writes, "[t]he tendency is ...to
speak of maintaining 'the right level of terror' rather than of encour-
aging positive attitudes."81
By contrast, "maintaining 'the right level of terror"' clearly
would be the wrong model for most child care work. This is so, I want
to suggest, because of the degree of freedom and discretion enjoyed
by such employees in performing their work. In such settings, a more
likely way to encourage desired performance from employees is to
pay a wage higher than what the traditional economic analysis would
suggest.
Of course, the notion of a "higher wage" equilibrium as a result
of the fairness dynamic does not necessarily ensure that the employ-
ees in question were earning-prior to the elimination in 1974 of the
FLSA exemption-a "living wage," one capable of sustaining them at
79 Fast Food Women (Appalshop 1991).
80 Truman F. Bewley, A Quest for an Explanation of Downward Wage Rigidity
Through Conversations with Decision Makers 16 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the New York University Law Review).
81 Id. at 5.
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reasonable standards.82 Even a wage above the minimum required by
the FLSA might well not be a living wage. Whether it is depends, of
course, on the gap between the legally required minimum and the
level required for a living wage-a gap that has varied over time with
the level of the minimum wage in real terms.8 3 As an interesting point
of comparison, in the Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl study, the result of
fairness behavior is an average wage that is more than twice the wage
predicted by the traditional economic analysis. 4
3. The Failure to Cover Independent Contractors
The FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies to "employees"
but not to "independent contractors. s85 Unlike the limit pertaining to
domestic service employees, this limit on the coverage of the FLSA
continues in effect today. As with the aspects of the FLSA discussed
above, it may be possible to make some sense of this feature of the
law by reference to the fairness dynamic and the relative difficulty of
monitoring independent contractors versus employees.
Under the FLSA, whether an individual is an independent con-
tractor or an employee turns on the following factors:
1. the nature and degree of the employer's control as to the man-
ner in which the work is to be performed;
2. the individual's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon
his managerial skill;
3. the individual's investment in equipment or materials required
for his task, or his employment of workers;
4. whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
5. the degree of permanency and duration of the working
relationship;
6. the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of
the employer's business.8 6
The first, fourth, and fifth of these factors are likely to correlate
with the difficulty of monitoring an individual's work. The less control
an employer has as to the manner in which the work is to be per-
formed (the first factor), the more difficult it is likely to be for the
employer to monitor that work. Similarly, the more skilled the indi-
vidual's work (the fourth factor), the more difficult it is likely to be for
82 See generally Lawrence B. Glickman, A Living Wage: American Workers and the
Making of Consumer Society 61-77 (1997) (defining "living wage").
83 See William P. Quigley, The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y. City L. Rev. 139, 167, 169-70 (1998) (giving minimum
wage value in real terms at various points in time).
84 See Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, supra note 5, at 443, 446.
85 E.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1531 (7th Cir. 1987).
86 Id. at 1535.
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the employer to monitor the work. And finally, the lesser the degree
of permanency and duration of the working relationship (the fifth fac-
tor), the greater the difficulty of (successful) monitoring of the indi-
vidual's work, as there will not be a long horizon over which the
employer can look for poor performance. Based upon these factors,
the work of independent contractors is likely to be more difficult, all
else equal, to monitor than that of employees, and thus, according to
the fairness dynamic, the application of a minimum wage requirement
will be less necessary, all else equal, to raise the wages of independent
contractors than to raise the wages of employees.
The fairness dynamic thus provides some assistance in making
sense of the oft-criticized failure of the FLSA to cover independent
contractors. This is not to say, though, that every exclusion accom-
plished by that coverage failure makes sense; some exclusions-such
as that by some courts of migrant farm workers-seem hard to make
sense of, as Judge Frank Easterbrook (among others) has
recognized. 87
4. Costs of FLSA Coverage
The central implication of the fairness dynamic is that the mini-
mum wage requirement of the FLSA is less necessary, all else equal,
to raise wages in settings in which monitoring is difficult than in set-
tings in which monitoring is less difficult. But perhaps this argument
implies nothing more than that a minimum wage requirement would
simply be irrelevant in settings in which, because of monitoring diffi-
culties, fairness pushes up wages without the need for legal interven-
tion. What are the costs, if any, of imposing a minimum wage
requirement? Why bother exempting certain employees if the law
would simply be irrelevant to them given the operation of the fairness
dynamic?
From a law and economics perspective, it may seem obvious that
any form of legal regulation is likely to carry with it costs, so that a
regulation that is believed to produce no or few positive effects obvi-
ously should not be imposed. But it is worth pausing briefly to con-
sider what exactly these costs might be insofar as minimum wage
regulation is concerned.
First, like any legal regulation, a minimum wage requirement im-
poses administrative costs, for even an employer who has conformed
substantively to the requirement may always be haled into court and
asked to prove to the court's satisfaction that it has done so. The
point here is parallel to Richard Epstein's point that a "good cause"
87 Id. at 1543-45.
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standard for discharging employees will impose administrative costs
even on employers who obey the substantive standard. 88
Second, a related point is that if an employer must be able to
prove in court that it has met the minimum wage requirement, the
employer will have to track and maintain records of the specific num-
ber of hours worked by each employee in exchange for the pay re-
ceived by the employee. This practice obviously entails costs.
Third, and in a somewhat different vein, it might be argued that
the imposition of a minimum wage requirement in a given setting has
the effect of contributing undesirably to the commodification of work
in that setting. This point may bear particularly on the context of do-
mestic service employees, who, as noted above, were exempted from
the FLSA's minimum wage requirement prior to 1974. As Katharine
Silbaugh has noted, "remov[ing] paid domestic workers from the for-
mal economy" by exempting them from various forms of employment
regulation may result from a strong anticommodification perspective
on domestic labor.8 9
Fourth, and most linked to the central ideas explored in this
work, it may be the case that minimum wage regulation in a particular
setting would serve as a signal to market participants that employers
were not sufficiently trustworthy to be left on their own in setting
wages. As Tamar Frankel and Wendy Gordon succinctly put it in dis-
cussing the general idea that legal regulation may signal a lack of trust,
"trust begets trust, while mistrust begets mistrust."90 On this view,
minimum wage regulation might disrupt the operation of the fairness
dynamic. Of course, another, perhaps more optimistic perspective-
advanced by (among others) Dan Kahan-is that legal regulation,
with its expressive aspects, may help to encourage rather than under-
mine trust relationships; Kahan, however, appears to view this possi-
bility as more applicable to areas such as drunk driving than to the
employment setting.91
B. Compliance
The fairness dynamic has implications not only for the appropri-
ate coverage of the FLSA's minimum wage requirement but also for
88 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 970
(1984).
89 Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 81, 113-15 (1997).
90 Tamar Frankel & Wendy J. Gordon, Introduction to Symposium, Trust Relation-
ships, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 321, 322 (2001).
91 See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333, 344-46
(2001).
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the likelihood that this requirement will be binding on employers. If it
is not binding, then compliance will not be a concern. The issue of
whether the requirement binds is of real significance because it seems
clear that serious compliance problems with the minimum wage re-
quirement exist in some sectors, 92 and thus it is important to know
where it might be sensible to target enforcement efforts.
For the reasons given above, the fairness dynamic suggests that
enforcement will be less necessary in circumstances in which workers
are difficult to monitor than in circumstances in which they are rela-
tively easy to monitor, for in difficult-to-monitor settings fairness con-
cerns exert an upward pressure on wages wholly apart from any legal
regulation. I do not offer this suggestion as a fundamental driver of
enforcement behavior; instead I simply mean to make the ultimately
commonsensical observation that if an employer is trusting an em-
ployee to work well using judgment and discretion and the employer
cannot accurately monitor the degree to which this is occurring, we
might not worry too much about the likelihood that the employer will
decide to pay the employee less than $5.15 an hour.
III
SOME BRIEF REMARKS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
As described above, the fairness dynamic suggests that minimum
wage regulation is less necessary than it otherwise would be in settings
in which employees are difficult to monitor, as in those situations fair-
ness considerations may exert an upward pressure on wages wholly
apart from legal regulation. A natural extension of this idea suggests
that in situations in which employees are difficult to monitor, regula-
tion of employee benefits may similarly be less necessary than it
would otherwise be.
But in fact the fairness dynamic provides a far less convincing
basis for a laissez-faire, nonregulatory approach in the case of regula-
tion of employee benefits than in the case of a minimum wage re-
quirement. Many benefits are presently mandated by law,93 and the
fairness dynamic does not provide much grounds for abandoning this
approach. The reason for this is simple. Various market failures, such
as imperfect information and adverse selection, may prevent the vol-
untary provision of employee benefits even if fairness considerations
92 E.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage
Law, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 333, 338-47 (1979).
93 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 225-26
(2001) (providing examples of mandates).
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work in favor of their being offered. 94 By contrast, with the simple
setting of the wage level, it is harder to tell comparable stories of
traditional economic market failure. The theme of the relationship
between the fairness dynamic and laissez-faire prescriptions is taken
up again in the following section.
CONCLUSION
In the setup examined in the Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl study
described in Part I above, the behavior predicted by the traditional
economic analysis leads to a suboptimal solution from an overall effi-
ciency standpoint.95 "[I]f all agents are money maximizers, there is a
conflict between individual and collective rationality," with individual
rationality leading to a departure from collective rationality.96 This
departure is one of the classic justifications for legal intervention
within the law and economics framework, with the Prisoner's Di-
lemma model being a canonical illustration.
But fairness concerns disrupt this otherwise compelling rationale
for legal intervention. Fairness considerations suggest that parties
may be able to resolve the conflict between individual and collective
rationality on their own.97 Fairness considerations thus complement
other reasons, such as reputational factors, for thinking that legal in-
tervention is less necessary than might otherwise be thought. 98
An interesting feature of this conclusion is its political orienta-
tion. While some might naturally assume that behavioral economics
(as compared to traditional economic analysis) is more rather than
less likely to provide normative support for legal intervention-and
while in some cases this may be true99-the case of fairness is an im-
portant counterexample. If we take seriously the idea that people
care about fair treatment, they may be more likely than we would
otherwise assume to resolve their conflicts on their own, and the role
of the law will accordingly be reduced.
94 See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Observations on Employment-Based Government Man-
dates, with Particular Reference to Health Insurance, in Labor Markets, Employment Pol-
icy, and Job Creation 297, 301 (Lewis C. Solmon & Alec R. Levenson eds., 1994)
(imperfect information); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated
Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings), May 1989, at 177, 179 (adverse
selection).
95 Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, supra note 5, at 445.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Dis-
putes (1991) (discussing nonlegal solutions among Shasta County farmers and ranchers);
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Ac-
tion (1990) (describing nonlegal solutions in various contexts).
99 See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1541-43.
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In the specific context of wage-setting, however, an important as-
sumption underlies the laissez-faire nature of this normative conclu-
sion. That assumption is that the benefit of pushing up wages
outweighs the cost of the reduced employment that is likely to come
along with higher wages for those who remain employed. When a
minimum wage is imposed by Congress, one might reasonably assume
that the trade-off between higher wages and higher employment has
been resolved by the polity in favor of higher wages (assuming that
there is in fact such a trade-off). 100 But when the increase in wages
occurs, as in the discussion above, through the operation of market
forces rather than through legislation, it is, ironically, possible at least
in theory that the resulting wage is too high relative to the social opti-
mum, and thus that government intervention is needed to protect op-
portunities for employment from encroachment by excessive wage
levels. So fairness, in this particular context, could conceivably argue
for the necessity of market intervention rather than against the neces-
sity of such intervention. The point, more generally, is that it is often
more difficult than observers have realized to generalize about the
political orientation of behavioral law and economics; this is true in
the employment setting on which the present Symposium focuses and
presumably in other settings as well.
100 For the leading defense of the idea that no wage-employment trade-off exists, see
David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the
Minimum Wage (1995). For a response, see David Neumark & William Wascher, Mini-
mum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania: Comment, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 1362 (2000).
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